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THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CREATES 
UNCERTAINTY BY APPLYING THE RULE 
OF LENITY IN UNITED STATES v. IZURIETA 
Abstract: On February 22, 2013, in United States v. Izurieta, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found 18 U.S.C. § 545—a federal statute crimi-
nalizing the importation of goods “contrary to law”—ambiguous as to whether it 
criminalizes violations of a regulation and, as a result, applied the rule of lenity. 
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected approaches espoused by two split 
circuits, instead examining whether the regulation appears civil or criminal in na-
ture. To avoid this type of uncertainty, this Comment argues that courts should 
instead apply the rule of lenity consistently based on § 545’s ambiguous text and 
history, rather than examine the nature of each regulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, imposes criminal penal-
ties on anyone who knowingly imports goods into the United States “contrary 
to law.”1 Through this “contrary to law” phrase, the statute criminalizes con-
duct that may be illegal under other sources of law, but is not necessarily crim-
inal according to those sources.2 Courts disagree on how broadly “law” should 
be construed under the statute and whether it criminalizes violations of regula-
tions or only of statutes.3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit de-
fines “law” narrowly, including regulations only when a statute specifies that 
violation of the regulation is a crime.4 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, however, defines “law” broadly, so that regulations having the 
“force and effect of law” fall under the statute.5 
In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in United 
States v. Izurieta, rejected both approaches by examining whether the regula-
                                                                                                                           
 1 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2006) (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United 
States, any merchandise contrary to law . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
20 years, or both.”). 
 2 United States v. Place, 693 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 3 Compare United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1179–81 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that 
“law” is ambiguous as to whether it criminalizes violations of a regulation appearing civil and con-
tractual in nature), with Unites States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding 
that “law” includes regulations only when a statute specifically states that a violation of the regulation 
constitutes a crime), and United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that 
“law” encompasses regulations having the “force and effect of law”). 
 4 Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. 
 5 Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470. 
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tion at issue appears civil or criminal in nature.6 The defendants were convict-
ed under § 545 for violating a Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) 
regulation governing the conditional release of imported goods.7 Finding the 
regulation primarily civil in nature, the court applied the rule of lenity, con-
cluding that § 545 is ambiguous as to whether it criminalizes violations of the 
Customs regulation, and accordingly vacated the convictions.8 
This Comment argues that courts should apply the rule of lenity consist-
ently in all cases involving regulations because of the ambiguous text and his-
tory of § 545, as evidenced by the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ drastically differ-
ent interpretations.9 Part I of this Comment describes the crime allegedly 
committed by the Izurieta defendants and outlines the procedural history of the 
case.10 Part II discusses the divergent circuit court interpretations of “law” un-
der § 545.11 Finally, Part III argues that courts should apply the rule of lenity to 
all § 545 cases involving regulations because examining regulations on a case-
by-case basis creates needless uncertainty in determining whether a regulatory 
violation qualifies as a § 545 violation.12 
I. THE ALLEGED CRIME: IMPORTING GOODS IN VIOLATION OF  
A CUSTOMS REGULATION 
On May 11, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida found Yuri Izurieta and his wife, Anneri, as well as their company, 
Naver Trading, Corp. (“Naver”), guilty of violating § 545 by importing dairy 
products “contrary to law.”13 The Izurietas founded and operate Naver, a com-
pany that imports cheese, butter, and bread from Central America into the 
United States.14 The Izurietas were convicted under § 545 for violating 19 
C.F.R. § 141.113(c), a Customs regulation governing the conditional release of 
imported goods pending Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.15 The 
defendants failed to redeliver to Customs five shipments of dairy products and 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See 710 F.3d at 1183–84. 
 7 Id. at 1178. 
 8 Id. at 1183–84. 
 9 See infra notes 63–79 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–29 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 30–62 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 63–79 and accompanying text. 
 13 Brief of Appellant at 1, Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176 (No. 11-13585), 2012 WL690501. 
 14 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178. 
 15 Recall of Merchandise Released from Customs and Border Protection Custody, 19 C.F.R. 
§ 141.113(c) (2010) (“For the purposes of determining the admissibility of any food, drug, device, 
cosmetic, or tobacco product . . . the release from [Customs] of any such product will be deemed con-
ditional.”); Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178. 
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failed to make one shipment available for FDA examination, thereby violating 
the conditional release provisions of § 141.113(c).16 
To facilitate the inspection of food products seeking entry into the United 
States, § 141.113(c) allows importers to temporarily take possession of their 
imported goods pending FDA inspection.17 These goods are on hold and can-
not be distributed until the FDA provides formal authorization for entry.18 If 
the goods are found to be contaminated or otherwise unfit for distribution, the 
FDA may demand that they be redelivered to Customs for exportation or de-
struction.19 Failure to comply with § 141.113(c) gives rise to a civil remedy of 
liquidated damages in the amount of three times the value of the goods.20 
Given the nature of the regulation, the Eleventh Circuit, on appeal, sua 
sponte raised the question of whether the indictment in Izurieta sufficiently 
alleged a crime.21 Because the indictment only alleged a violation of a regula-
tion, the court considered whether § 545 criminalizes violations of regulations 
or only of statutes.22 Rejecting both the Ninth and Fourth Circuit approaches to 
interpreting “law” under § 545, the Izurieta court instead examined 
§ 141.113(c) to determine whether the regulation appears civil or criminal in 
nature.23 Concluding that § 141.113(c) prescribes civil remedies and merely 
governs the conditions under which Customs may release imported goods 
pending approval by the FDA, the court found the regulation civil and contrac-
tual in nature.24 
Even with this determination, however, the Court ultimately concluded 
that § 545 is ambiguous as to whether it criminalizes violations of the Customs 
regulation and, as a result, applied the rule of lenity to the Izurietas.25 The rule 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178. 
 17 See 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2006). Before food products are approved for entry into the United States, 
they are subject to inspection by the FDA under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). 
See id. Importers taking possession of their goods pending FDA approval must store them pursuant to 
security measures prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 19 U.S.C. § 1499(a)(1) (2006) (“Im-
ported merchandise . . . shall not be delivered from customs custody except under such bond or other 
security as may be prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury] to assure compliance with all applica-
ble laws . . . .”). 
 18 See 21 U.S.C. § 381(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 19 See id. § 381(a); 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c), (e), (i). 
 20 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c)(3) (“[F]ailure to comply . . . will result in the assessment of liquidated 
damages equal to three times the value of the merchandise involved . . . .”). 
 21 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1178–79. 
 22 See id. at 1179. 
 23 See id. at 1181–82. 
 24 Id. at 1183–84. 
 25 See id. at 1184. The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s strict requirement that a statute 
must specify that violating a regulation is a crime for it to qualify as a “law.” See id. at 1181; cf. Al-
ghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. At the same time, Court expressed concern with the Fourth Circuit’s broad 
definition of  “law,” which encompasses all regulations having the “force and effect of law,” including 
those derived in a non-criminal context. See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181–82; cf. Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 
476. 
118 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:E. Supp. 
of lenity indicates that when there is grievous ambiguity in a criminal statute, 
the issue should be resolved in favor of defendants.26 Applying the rule of leni-
ty ensures that potential wrongdoers receive fair warning of the legal conse-
quences of their actions.27 Moreover, the rule prevents courts from defining 
criminal conduct, a power properly reserved for the legislature.28 Accordingly, 
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the convictions under § 545.29 
II. DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF “LAW” UNDER § 545 
In Izurieta, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed 18 U.S.C. § 545 in light of a 
circuit split defining “law” in different ways under the statute.30 Both the Ninth 
and Fourth Circuits examined the text and history of § 545 to discern the 
meaning of the word “law,” but came to drastically different conclusions.31 
Section A describes the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of “law” under 
§ 545.32 Section B then describes the Fourth Circuit’s broad interpretation of 
“law” under the statute.33 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Narrow Approach: Defining “Law” as Including a 
Regulation Only When a Statute Specifies That Violation  
of the Regulation Is a Crime 
In 2008, in United States v. Alghazouli, the Ninth Circuit narrowly con-
cluded that § 545 criminalizes a violation of a regulation only when a statute 
specifies that the violation is a crime.34 In coming to this conclusion, the court 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) (concluding that a statute making it 
unlawful to knowingly make a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm is un-
ambiguous as to whether it covers redemption of a firearm from a pawn shop); Sarah Newland, The 
Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 198 
(1994). The rule of lenity stands for the principle that individuals should have fair warning of what 
constitutes criminal conduct and prevents courts from extending the reach of a statute beyond what the 
legislature clearly stated. Newland, supra, at 197. Courts applying the rule must balance the compet-
ing interests of the judiciary, legislature and individuals. Id. at 203. 
 27 See Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 831. 
 28 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (applying the rule of lenity by adopting the 
narrower reading of a statute and requiring the government to show a nexus between a defendant’s 
firearms possession and interstate commerce, which it failed to do); see also Newland, supra note 26, 
at 197 (observing that the rule of lenity constrains the power of the courts). 
 29 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1184. 
 30 710 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2013); see also 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2006) (imposing criminal 
penalties on anyone who knowingly imports goods into the United States “contrary to law”). 
 31 Compare United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
“law” includes regulations only when a statute specifically states that a violation of the regulation 
constitutes a crime), with United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that 
“law” encompasses regulations having the “force and effect of law”). 
 32 See infra notes 34–51 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 52–62 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. 
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examined the plain language and legislative history of § 545.35 First, the court 
concluded that the plain meaning of “law” does not always or even usually 
include regulations.36 Thus, statutes that do not specifically refer to laws and 
regulations only refer to statutes.37 
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the legislative history of § 545 reveals 
Congress’s intent for “law” to include regulations only when a statute specifies 
that violating the regulation is a crime.38 In both 1922 and 1930, Congress 
reenacted Section 4 of the Tariff Act of 1866, the predecessor to § 545, without 
any change.39 Notably, these reenactments occurred after the U.S. Supreme 
Court had determined that violating a regulation becomes criminal only when a 
statute specifies that doing so is a crime.40 For example, in 1892, in United 
States v. Eaton, the Court reversed a criminal conviction for violation of a 
bookkeeping regulation under a statute that imposed criminal penalties for 
omitting to do anything “required by law.”41 The Court held that the conviction 
could not stand because no statute specified that violation of the regulation was 
a crime.42 Conversely, in 1911 in United States v. Grimaud, the Court allowed 
a conviction under the predecessor to § 545 for violating a regulation because a 
statute specified that violations of such regulations “shall be punished.”43 Tak-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See id. at 1183–87. 
 36 See id. at 1183–84. The Ninth Circuit cited the 2004 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, which 
defines “law” as “a statute,” but also more broadly as “[t]he aggregate of legislation, judicial prece-
dents, and accepted legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative 
action; esp., the body of rules, standards, and principles that the courts of a particular jurisdiction 
apply[.]” Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 900 (8th ed. 2004)). The most recent edition defines 
the term identically. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 952 (9th ed. 2009). 
 37 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1183–84. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 593, 42 Stat. 858, 982; Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 593, 46 
Stat. 590, 751. The Tariff Act of 1866 prohibited the fraudulent or knowing importation of merchan-
dise “contrary to law.” An Act Further to Prevent Smuggling and for Other Purposes (Tariff Act), 14 
Stat. 178, 179 (1866). 
 40 See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518–19, 522–23 (1911); United States v. Eaton, 
144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892). After Eaton and Grimaud, Congress reenacted the Tariff Act in 1922 and 
1930 without changing the “contrary to law” language. See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 593; Tariff 
Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 593. 
 41 See 144 U.S. at 686–88. The defendant was convicted under the Oleomargarine Act of 1886, 
which provided criminal penalties if the omission was knowing or willful. See Oleomargarine Act of 
1886, ch. 840, § 18, 24 Stat. 209, 212. 
 42 See Eaton, 144 U.S. at 688 (indicating that the Oleomargarine Act criminalized the failure to 
perform actions “required by law”). In contrast to Eaton, the federal smuggling act in Izurieta crimi-
nalizes actions “contrary to law.” See 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2006); 710 F.3d at 1178. Courts apply the same 
reasoning to these opposing frameworks, however, because criminal convictions result whether the 
defendant violated the law or failed to act in accordance with the law. See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 
1184–86 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “law” in Eaton). 
 43 See 220 U.S. at 518–19, 522–23; see also Estes v. United States, 227 F. 818, 821–22 (8th Cir. 
1915) (comparing Eaton and Grimaud and affirming a conviction under Section 4 of the Tariff Act of 
1866 because a statute criminalized violations of the regulation). The Secretary of Agriculture prom-
ulgated the regulation under the Forest Reserve Act. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 509. The Forest Reserve 
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en together, Eaton and Grimaud indicate that the Court interpreted “law” to 
mean regulations only when an accompanying statute specifies that violating 
the regulation is a crime.44 Thus, the Alghazouli court concluded that Congress 
endorsed the Court’s interpretation of “law” when it reenacted the statute with-
out change.45 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit observed that Congress’s 2006 amendment of 
§ 545 as well as the simultaneous enactment of a parallel provision criminaliz-
ing the illegal exportation of goods indicated legislative intent to interpret 
§ 545 narrowly.46 In 2006, Congress enacted the Patriot Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act, which amended § 545 by increasing the maximum sen-
tence, but otherwise left the statute unchanged.47 At the same time, Congress 
added an entirely new provision to the Act, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 554, 
which mirrors the language of § 545 but criminalizes the exportation of 
goods—rather than importation—“contrary to any law or regulation.”48 Con-
gress introduced § 554 and amended § 545 simultaneously, but did not add the 
word “regulation” to § 545.49 Because courts cannot interpret statutes in a way 
that renders other language superfluous, the Alghazouli court explained that 
“law” in § 554 cannot include regulations without rendering the “or regula-
tions” language superfluous.50 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the word 
“law” under § 545 cannot necessarily include regulations.51 
                                                                                                                           
Act indicated that violations of this regulation should be criminalized. Forest Reserve Act, ch. 2, § 1, 
30 Stat. 34, 35 (1897) (“The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the protection [of 
public national forests] . . . and any violation of [the rules and regulations promulgated] shall be pun-
ished by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.”). 
 44 See Eaton, 144 U.S. at 688 (“It is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should exist for 
declaring any act or omission a criminal offen[s]e.”); Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 519 (“The very thing 
which was omitted in [Eaton] has been distinctly done . . . .”). 
 45 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186. As a canon of statutory construction, Congress is presumed to 
be aware of judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute 
without change. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). 
 46 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186–87. 
 47 See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–177, § 310, 
120 Stat. 192, 242 (2006). 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 554 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 49 See id. § 545 (2006); id. § 554; Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. 
 50 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187 (referencing a rule of statutory construction which provides 
that courts must give effect to every word in a statute and avoid constructions that render other words 
superfluous). 
 51 See id.; see also Ariz. Elec. Power Coop. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“When Congress includes a specific term in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it should not be implied where it is excluded.”). Courts presume that every word in a 
statute has a purpose and that Congress purposely excluded the words not used. 2A NORMAN J. SING-
ER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2008). The same words used twice are 
presumed to have the same meaning and different words are not construed to have the same meaning. 
Id. The Ninth Circuit in Alghazouli noted that the close relationship between § 545 and § 554 suggests 
that “law” has the same meaning in each provision. See 517 F.3d at 1187. 
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B. The Fourth Circuit’s Broad Approach: Defining “Law” as Including 
Regulations That Have the “Force and Effect of Law” 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s narrow analysis of “law,” in 1994, in United 
States v. Mitchell, the Fourth Circuit broadly concluded that § 545 criminalizes 
a violation of a regulation so long as it has the “force and effect of law.”52 The 
court examined the plain meaning of “law” and concluded that it is commonly 
defined to include administrative regulations.53 Indeed, in 1979 in Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, the Supreme Court declared that the word “law” in the “au-
thorized by law” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1905 includes regulations.54 Be-
cause properly promulgated, substantive regulations have the “force and effect 
of law,” the Court held that it would take a clear showing of contrary legisla-
tive intent for a definition of “law” to not include such regulations.55 Given 
this Chrysler precedent, the Fourth Circuit in Mitchell held that “law” under 
§ 545 includes regulations, as there is no showing of contrary legislative in-
tent.56 
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Mitchell is in direct conflict with the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of legislative history and use of the rule of lenity in 
Izurieta.57 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, because Congress re-enacted the 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See 39 F.3d at 470. To discern which regulations have the “force and effect of law,” the Fourth 
Circuit adopted the three-prong test found in the 1979 U.S. Supreme Court case Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown. See 441 U.S. 281, 301–02 (1979) (establishing the test); Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470–71 (applying 
the test). First, the regulation must be substantive, rather than interpretive, general or organizational, 
and it must affect individual rights. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301–02. Second, the regulation must have 
been promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of quasi-legislative authority. Id. at 302. Third, its 
promulgation must have conformed with congressionally imposed procedural requirements. Id. at 303. 
The Fourth Circuit in Mitchell found that regulations promulgated by Customs, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and the Department of Agriculture satisfy the test and therefore have the “force and effect of 
law.” See 39 F.3d at 471. 
 53 Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468. The Fourth Circuit cited the 1979 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, 
which defines law as “a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and 
having binding legal force.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 795 (5th ed. 1979).  
 54 See Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 295–96, 298; Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468. Similarly, in 1920 in Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court indicated that properly promulgated, substan-
tive regulations have the “force and effect of law.” 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1905, 
federal officers who disclose confidential information “not authorized by law” will be discharged from 
employment and may be fined or imprisoned for not more than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006). 
 55 Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 295–96. 
 56 Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468–69. The court explained that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 545 
(2006) gives no indication that Congress intended to exclude regulations from the definition of “law.” 
See id. at 469. In doing so, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that regulations were uncom-
mon when Congress enacted the prior version of § 545 in 1866 and thus Congress could not have 
intended “law” to include regulations. See id. 
 57 Compare Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470 (holding that § 545 criminalizes regulations having the 
“force and effect of law” because the Supreme Court had interpreted “law” in another context to in-
clude such regulations), with Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187 (holding that § 545 only criminalizes viola-
tions of regulations when a statute specifies that violating the regulation is a crime because Congress 
reenacted the predecessor to § 545 after the Supreme Court adopted this definition and Congress sim-
122 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:E. Supp. 
predecessor to § 545 with knowledge that the Supreme Court had interpreted 
the “contrary to law” provision in other contexts to include regulations, Con-
gress could not have intended to exclude regulations from the definition of 
“law” under § 545.58 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that “law” cannot in-
clude regulations because Congress reenacted § 545 after the Supreme Court 
declared that § 545 only criminalizes regulations when a statute specifies that 
violating the regulation is a crime and simultaneously enacted a similar provi-
sion using the word “regulation.”59 Despite Eaton and Grimaud, the Mitchell 
court relied on Chrysler precedent to conclude that “law” includes regulations 
having the “force and effect of law.”60 Moreover, relying on Chrysler in this 
way allowed the Fourth Circuit to reject the defendant’s contention that § 545 
is ambiguous.61 Thus, the court concluded that it was unnecessary to apply the 
rule of lenity, as Congress reenacted the predecessor to § 545 with knowledge 
that it had been interpreted to include regulations having the “force and effect 
of law.”62 
III. THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RATIONALE FOR 
APPLYING THE RULE OF LENITY 
To avoid creating unnecessary uncertainty, courts should consistently ap-
ply the rule of lenity, regardless of the nature of the regulation, due to 18 
U.S.C. § 545’s ambiguous text and history.63 As evidenced by the drastically 
different approaches articulated by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Elev-
enth, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits, § 545 is ambiguous as to whether it criminal-
                                                                                                                           
ultaneously enacted a similar provision but added “regulation”), and Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1183–84 
(finding § 545 ambiguous as to whether it criminalizes a violation of a Customs regulation and apply-
ing the rule of lenity). 
 58 See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470. 
 59 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. 
 60 See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 469. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit found the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretations of “law” in other contexts persuasive, while the Ninth Circuit found the legislative history 
of § 545 more persuasive. Compare Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 469 (noting the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of “law” under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006) and applying that definition to § 545), with Alghazouli, 
517 F.3d at 1187 (noting Congress’s 1922 and 1930 reenactments of § 545—without change—in light 
of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “law” under § 545 and Congress’s 2006 reenactment of 
§ 545—without change—alongside a parallel provision adding the word “regulations”). 
 61 See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470. 
 62 See id. at 469. 
 63 See Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpreta-
tions of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (1997) (argu-
ing that where a statute and regulation combine to create criminal liability, strict construction is neces-
sary to provide fair notice to regulated parties); Newland, supra note 26, at 198 (discussing two ap-
proaches to applying the rule of lenity: (1) examining the text of the statute only and (2) examining the 
legislative history if text is ambiguous; and noting that Justice Scalia has even argued that resorting to 
legislative history creates impermissible uncertainty). 
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izes violations of regulations in general.64 A case-by-case approach that ana-
lyzes whether a regulation appears civil or criminal in nature, as the Eleventh 
Circuit does in Izurieta, creates uncertainty by failing to set a clear standard 
regarding which regulations § 545 criminalizes.65 Applying the rule of lenity 
consistently based on the ambiguousness of § 545 will give fair notice to de-
fendants and avoid a case-by-case judicial determination as to whether a regu-
lation “seems” civil or criminal in nature.66 
Analyzing the scope of § 545 by assessing the nature of a particular regu-
lation creates uncertainty by confusing two central questions: (1) whether a 
regulation has the “force and effect of law,” and (2) whether “law” under § 545 
is ambiguous.67 When addressing questions of ambiguity, courts should look 
only to the text and history of a criminal statute,68 and in some cases end the 
inquiry at the text of the statute.69 Contrary to the Izurieta court’s analysis, de-
termining whether a regulation is civil or that it has the “force and effect of 
law” is irrelevant in discerning the meaning of “law” under § 545 and whether 
the statute is ambiguous.70 Moreover, when looking to the text and history of 
§ 545, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ drastically different conclusions demon-
strate that the word “law” as used in § 545 is patently ambiguous.71 The federal 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 545 (2006) only criminalizes violations of regulations when a statute specifies that violating the 
regulation is a crime because definitions of “law” typically do not include regulations, Congress reen-
acted the predecessor to § 545 after the U.S. Supreme Court espoused this definition, and Congress 
simultaneously enacted a similar provision but added “regulation”); United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 
465, 470 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that § 545 criminalizes all regulations having the “force and effect 
of law” because the definition of “law” commonly includes regulations and the Supreme Court has 
established that properly promulgated regulations have the “force and effect of law”); Newland, supra 
note 26, at 198 (describing how courts apply the rule of lenity). 
 65 See Greenberg, supra note 63, at 40–41; Newland, supra note 26, at 198; cf. United States v. 
Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2013) (analyzing whether § 545 appears civil or criminal in 
nature). 
 66 See Newland, supra note 26, at 198 (discussing two approaches to applying the rule of lenity); 
cf. Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1184 (concluding that § 545 is ambiguous and applying a case-by-case analy-
sis). 
 67 See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 477 (Murnaghan, C.J., dissenting). Judge Murnaghan noted that there 
are two distinct questions to be addressed: whether the regulations have the force of law and the 
meaning of “law” under § 545. Id. He argued that the majority spent considerable time establishing 
that the regulations have the force of law, which is irrelevant to the meaning of “law” under § 545. Id. 
 68 See Newland, supra note 26, at 198 (outlining the traditional rule of lenity analysis). 
 69 See United States v. Hughey, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (holding that if the text of a statute is 
ambiguous, legislative history will not resolve ambiguity against a criminal defendant). 
 70 See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 477 (Murnaghan, C.J., dissenting); Newland, supra note 26, at 198 
(discussing the two traditional approaches to applying the rule of lenity: analyzing the statute’s text 
and analyzing the statute’s text and its legislative history); cf. Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1184 (applying the 
rule of lenity after concluding that the regulation is civil and contractual in nature). 
 71 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (finding a federal statute ambiguous after 
examining its text and legislative history); Newland, supra note 26, at 198 (explaining that analyzing 
the text and legislative history of a statute is one of the traditional approaches to applying the rule of 
lenity). The courts drew these conflicting conclusions after examining the text and history of 18 
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appeals courts could not even agree about whether the dictionary definition of 
“law” included regulations.72 Thus, this disagreement regarding the scope of 
§ 545 demonstrates the statute’s ambiguity in and of itself without need to ex-
amine any particular regulation.73 
Applying the rule of lenity consistently will not only remove the uncer-
tainty in examining this ambiguous statute, but will also better ensure that im-
porters are on notice of the activities criminalized by § 545.74 Punishment is 
illegitimate unless individuals are given reasonable notice that their activities 
are criminally culpable.75 Because criminal penalties represent the ultimate 
governmental intrusion on individual freedom, courts consistently require en-
hanced clarity in criminal statutes.76 If courts consistently apply the rule of 
lenity in light of § 545’s ambiguity, rather than examine the nature of each reg-
ulation, importers will not need to guess whether they could face criminal pen-
alties for failing to comply with the numerous, complex regulations governing 
the importation of goods.77 Moreover, applying the rule of lenity consistently 
will address the Izurieta court’s concern with notice and punishing “innocent” 
conduct.78 Accordingly, courts should rationalize the application of the rule of 
                                                                                                                           
U.S.C. § 545 (2006). Compare Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187 (concluding that “law” includes regula-
tions only when a statute specifically states that a violation of the regulation constitutes a crime), with 
Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470 (concluding that “law” encompasses regulations having the “force and effect 
of law”). 
 72 Compare Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1183–84 (finding that the definition of “law” does not always, 
or perhaps even usually, include regulations), with Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468 (finding that “law” is 
commonly defined to include regulations). 
 73 See Newland, supra note 26, at 198 (discussing two approaches to applying the rule of lenity: 
examining the text and legislative history or examining the text only). 
 74 See Greenberg, supra note 63, at 17–18 (arguing that the rule of lenity shows little tolerance for 
statutory ambiguity). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 16; see also Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal 
Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1348 (2008) (acknowledging the 
historical trend of criminal law from common law to statutes, which is refined by applying the rule of 
lenity). 
 77 See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
465, 488–89 (2005) (noting that citizens often interpret law on the basis of what its words normally 
mean, rather than speculating on legislative intent or asking a lawyer). Citizens often have difficulty 
interpreting the law because asking lawyers is expensive and researching legislative intent can require 
lots of time and training. Id. Moreover, the evidence is often unavailable, skimpy, or conflicting. Id. 
Citizens can guess what legislators intended, but that can be risky. Id. 
 78 See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 77, at 488–89; Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2420, 2421 (2006) (arguing that courts often construe statutes narrowly when they would other-
wise punish innocent conduct). Indeed, asking whether the regulation, rather than the statute, seems 
criminal, as the Eleventh Circuit did in Izurieta, will create more notice problems than a consistent 
application of the rule of lenity. Cf. Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1184. 
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lenity by simply stating that “law” is ambiguous due to the text and history of 
§ 545.79 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Izurieta relied on the civil, con-
tractual nature of 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c), a Customs regulation, in holding that 
18 U.S.C. § 545 is ambiguous as to whether it criminalizes violations of the 
regulation. In doing so, it failed to clarify the meaning of “law” under § 545 
and created uncertainty as to which regulations § 545 criminalizes in the fu-
ture. To avoid unnecessary uncertainty, courts should instead apply the rule of 
lenity consistently in § 545 cases involving regulations. As evidenced by the 
Ninth and Fourth Circuit’s drastically different approaches, the text and history 
of § 545 is ambiguous as to whether § 545 criminalizes regulations in general, 
which calls for lenity notwithstanding the nature of the regulation. 
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 79 See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 477 (Murnaghan, C.J., dissenting); Greenberg, supra note 63, at 40–41; 
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